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Abstract. Lately, several works have analyzed potential uses of argumentation in multi-party debates.
Usually, the focus of such works is the computation of a collectively “correct” outcome, a challenging
task even when the debate’s users truthfully express their beliefs. This work focuses on debates where
some users may exhibit specific types of “malicious” behavior: they may lie (by making statements
they do not believe to hold) and they may hide valuable information (by not making relevant statements
they believe to hold). Our approach is the following: firstly, we define “user attributes” which capture
different aspects of a user’s behavior in a debate (how active, how opinionated and how classifiable
a user has been); then, we build and test experimentally hypotheses that, from the values of these
attributes, can predict whether a user has lied and/or hidden valuable information.
1 Introduction
Several works, e.g. [12, 13, 4, 10], have analyzed potential uses of argumentation in multi-party debates.
Some focus on computing a “correct” collective outcome [10], given the users’ claims, a challenging task
even when users truthfully express their opinions. Others, e.g. [12, 13, 15], focus on user strategies.
In [12] concepts from game theory are used for the analysis of argumentation debates. It is considered
that some users, in order to satisfy their preferences, may exhibit “malicious” behavior: they may lie (by
making claims they do not believe to hold) and, they may hide (by not making claims they believe to hold).
In this work we attempt the analysis of argumentation debates in order to estimate which users have
exhibited malicious behavior. We assume that there is an issue, which is an argument, being debated,
as for example in [11]. We also assume that each user has a viewpoint over that issue, in the form of
a (private) bipolar argumentation framework [1, 5], which has two types of relations over arguments: an
attack relation and a support relation. Users engage in a debate, by progressively stating new attacks and
supports. These debates can be seen as abstractions of opinion exchanges in social networks, in general, and
in argumentation-inspired social networks such as www.convinceme.net and www.quaestio-it.com [8].
In these settings, users have no access to the private argumentation frameworks of other users, and therefore
no way to assess the truthfulness of information contributed to the debate. Our work aims at helping users
and debate administrators estimate user truthfulness.
Our approach is the following: firstly, we define several user attributes which capture different aspects
of a user’s behavior (how active, opinionated, and classifiable a user has been in a debate). Then, we build
and test experimentally hypotheses that, from the values of these attributes, predict whether a user may
have lied and/or hidden valuable information. The experimental evaluation is in Java and simulates and
analyzes a large number of debates. Albeit preliminary, the results seem to suggest that user attributes may
indeed be good indicators of lying and hiding.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present background on bipolar argumentation. In
Section 3 we define our general debate framework. In Section 4 we define user attributes. In Section 5 we
define lying and hiding in our debate setting, and we propose two hypotheses for identifying malicious
behavior, which are experimentally tested in Section 6. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 Background on Bipolar Argumentation
A Bipolar Argumentation Framework (BAF) [5, 1] is a tuple 〈Arg,Att,Sup〉 where: Arg is a set, whose
elements are referred to as arguments, Att ⊆ Arg×Arg, referred to as attack relation over arguments, and
Sup⊆ Arg×Arg, referred to as support relation over arguments. We will represent BAFs as graphs whose
nodes are elements of Arg and whose edges are of two types: simple arrows, to represent attack in Att, and
double arrows, to represent support in Sup, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Three users take part in a debate about global warming. The issue being debated is argument a
= “global warming should be addressed now, because it already affects our ecosystems.” User u2 introduces
the attack (b,a) with b = “there is no conclusive proof of global warming taking place”, and then user u3
introduces the support (c,a) with c = “recent studies show that global warming effects are real”. User u1
observes the debate but, when he is able to intervene, he refuses to contribute. The debate gives rise to the
BAF 〈Arg,Att,Sup〉 with Arg = {a,b,c}, Att = {(b,a)} and Sup = {(c,a)}, represented graphically as:
a
b c
Arguments in BAFs may be evaluated using a number of different methods (known as “semantics”), falling
broadly within two classes: (1) methods for determining acceptable sets of arguments, e.g. as in [3], and
(2) methods for determining a numerical strength, e.g. as in [5, 2]. We shall focus on the latter approach,
but we will not commit to any specific method until Section 6. Until then, we will use a generic evaluation
function σ : Arg→ [0,1] but assume that the addition to a BAF of a support for (attack against) an argument
x increases (resp. decreases) σ(x). In Section 6 we will choose σ from [2], for which this assumption holds.
3 A General Debate Framework
The starting point for our work is a general framework for multi-party argumentation debate focused on
the evaluation of a specific argument, the issue of the debate, and involving users with different viewpoints
with respect to that issue, represented by private BAFs. The evaluation of the issue, after the aggregation
of all users’ opinions, can be deemed a collective goal, shared by all users. Also, we assume that each user
pursues a personal goal, which is either the maximization or the minimization of the issue’s evaluation.
Definition 1. Let a be the (debate) issue. Let U be a set of users. Each u ∈U has a private BAF, denoted
ASu = 〈Argu,Attu,Supu〉, such that a ∈ Argu, and a personal goal, which is either maxσ(a) or minσ(a).
A debate takes place in discrete timesteps. At each timestep, users introduce attacks against and/or supports
for arguments, or pass (introducing no attack or support).
Definition 2. A debate is a tuple D = 〈a,U, IntroAtt, IntroSup, IntroPass〉 such that:
IntroAtt ⊆ {〈t,u,(x,y)〉 | t ∈N, u ∈U}; IntroSup⊆ {〈t,u,(x,y)〉 | t ∈N, u ∈U};
IntroPass⊆ {〈t,u, pass〉 | t ∈N, u ∈U} where pass is a constant.
In the remainder of the paper, unless otherwise indicated, we will assume as given a debate D=〈a,U,
IntroAtt, IntroSup, IntroPass〉. The first timestep of a debate is 0, the last timestep is defined as follows:
Definition 3. The last timestep of D is lastT s(D) such that
if IntroAtt = IntroSup = IntroPass = {} then lastT s(D) = 0, otherwise lastT s(D) = t such that
1. ∃〈t,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroAtt ∪ IntroSup or ∃〈t,u, pass〉 ∈ IntroPass, and
2. 6 ∃〈t ′,u′,(x′,y′)〉 ∈ IntroAtt ∪ IntroSup and 6 ∃〈t ′,u′, pass〉 ∈ IntroPass such that t ′ > t.
All users’ introductions in a debate lead to the emergence of a collective opinion in the form of a com-
mon BAF, that we call gameboard as in [4, 10]. The fact that a debate “remembers” all the introductions
that users made, and when they made them, means that it is possible to compute the gameboard at every
timestep, up to and including the last, as follows:
Definition 4. Let t ∈ N be such that 0 ≤ t ≤ lastT s(D). The gameboard of D , at timestep t, is the BAF
GBDt = 〈ArgDt , AttDt , SupDt 〉, such that:
ArgDt = {a} ∪ {x,y | ∃〈t ′,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroAtt ∪ IntroSup, 0≤ t ′ ≤ t};
AttDt = {(x,y) | ∃〈t ′,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroAtt, 0≤ t ′ ≤ t};
SupDt = {(x,y) | ∃〈t ′,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroSup, 0≤ t ′ ≤ t}.
As an illustration, the BAF of Example 1 is the gameboard GBD3 at the last timestep of the following debate:
D = 〈a,{u1,u2,u3},{〈1,u2,(b,a)〉},{〈2,u3,(c,a)〉},{〈3,u1, pass〉}〉
Debates and gameboards are motivated by and provide abstractions of a number of currently available
online debate platforms, such as www.convinceme.net and www.quaestio-it.com. In these platforms,
users are able to make claims and back them up with relevant arguments, expressed in natural language, as
well as introduce relations between arguments, such as attacks and supports, or simply observe.
In the remainder, we will use the following notations. IntroDu = {〈t,u,ob j〉 | 〈t,u,ob j〉 ∈ IntroAtt ∪
IntroSup∪ IntroPass} denotes all the introductions by user u in D (similarly for IntroAttDu , IntroSupDu ,
IntroPassDu ). Moreover, for an introduction i = 〈t,u,ob j〉, where ob j = (x,y) or ob j = pass, the function
ts(i) returns its timestep t, while the function rel(i) returns (x,y) or pass, respectively. Furthermore, σDt (x)
denotes the evaluation, using σ as in Section 2, of argument x in GBDt . For all notations, if D is clear from
the context, we will drop theD superscript. Finally, we will refer to the set of all possible debates as ∆, and
to the union of all ArgDt for all t ∈N and D ∈ ∆ as Arg∆N.
4 User Behavior Analysis
In order to analyze user behavior in multi-party argumentation debates, we define three (user) attributes,
each capturing a specific aspect of user behavior. The first two attributes measure how active and opinion-
ated a user has been in a debate. Thus, they describe a user’s general stance in a debate. The third attribute
estimates how similar a user’s beliefs are to those of some known user classes.
The activity attribute indicates the quantity of a user’s contribution in a debate. Roughly, the less pass
introductions a user makes, the more active he is considered.
Definition 5. The activity evaluation of a user in a debate is given by the function active :U×∆→ [0,1]:
if |Introu|= 0, then active(u,D) = 0, else
active(u,D) =
|IntroAttu∪ IntroSupu|
|Introu|
Next, the opinionatedness attribute indicates how one-sided a user’s impact has been on an argument’s eval-
uation (with respect to σ). Roughly, the more a user has increased (or decreased) an argument’s evaluation,
the more opinionated he is deemed on that argument.
Definition 6. The opinionatedness evaluation of a user on an argument in a debate is given by the function
opinionated :U×Arg∆N×∆→ [0,1]: if ∑
i∈Introu
|σts(i)(x)−σts(i)−1(x)|=0, then opinionated(u,x,D)=0, else
opinionated(u,x,D) =
| ∑
i∈Introu
σts(i)(x)−σts(i)−1(x)|
∑
i∈Introu
|σts(i)(x)−σts(i)−1(x)|
In the fraction above, the numerator reflects how one-sided u’s impact has been on σ(x) (either increasing
it, or decreasing it), while the denominator reflects how large u’s overall impact has been on σ(x).
Example 2. Let us assume that in debate D , user u has made two relation introductions, and three pass
introductions. So, active(u,D) = |IntroAttu∪IntroSupu||Introu| =
2
2+3 =
2
5 = 0.4. Moreover, let us assume that u’s first
relation introduction had increased σ(a) from 0.2 to 0.7 and u’s second relation introduction had decreased
σ(a) from 0.5 to 0. Thus, opinionated(u,a,D) = |(0.7−0.2)+(0−0.5)||0.7−0.2|+|0−0.5| =
0
1 = 0. Notice that this is the lowest
possible opinionatedness value, indicating that u is not opinionated at all towards a. This is sensible, since
u has equally increased and decreased a’s evaluation.
In order to define the third user attribute, we introduce the notion of user class. In practice, if some users
think in a similar way about a topic, then we may say that they belong to the same class. For example, there
may be a class of users who believe global warming is a threat, and another class who believe it is not.
Most probably, users of the same class will agree on many points, though not on everything. For example,
a scientist may consider an elaborate argument that another user will not. We define user classes as BAFs:
Definition 7. Let C be a set of classes. For each κ∈C , ASκ=〈Argκ,Attκ,Supκ〉 is a BAF s.t. Attκ∪Supκ 6={}.
Users have personal BAFs which may be similar, but not identical, to classes, as illustrated next.
Example 3. For some κ ∈ C , let ASκ be as given below. Let u1,u2 ∈U with private BAFs ASu1 and ASu2
as given below. Both u1 and u2 may be deemed to belong to κ, even though ASu2 is not identical to ASκ.
a
b c
d
ASκ
a
b c
d
ASu1
a
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d e
ASu2
The classifiability attribute estimates how distant a user is from classes in some given set. The notion of
distance we use is inspired by the edit distance, used e.g. in [6], to measure the similarity of argumentation
systems, albeit in our case it depends on a class, on introductions by the user alone, and on those by the
other users.
Definition 8. The function distance :U×C×∆→ [0,1] is defined as distance(u,κ,D) = dsgu,κagru,κ+dsgu,κ , with
agru,κ (dsgu,κ), the number of agreements (resp. disagreements) between u and κ, computed as follows:
1. Set agru,κ := 0, dsgu,κ := 0.
2. For every (x,y) such that either (x,y) ∈ Attκ∪Supκ, or ∃〈t,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroAttu∪ IntroSupu, find the
corresponding case in the following table, where Rel is one of Att or Sup:
Case for (x,y) ∃〈t,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroRelu (x,y) ∈ Relκ ∃〈t
′,u′,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroRelu′
with u′ 6= u Considered
1 Yes Yes Yes Agreement
2 Yes Yes No Agreement
3 Yes No Yes Disagreement
4 Yes No No Disagreement
5 No Yes Yes Agreement
6 No Yes No Disagreement
7 No No Yes Agreement
8 No No No Agreement
If the column “Considered” gives “Agreement”, then agru,κ := agru,κ+1, else dsgu,κ := dsgu,κ+1.
Since the BAF of a class cannot (by definition) be without attacks and without supports, it can be proven
that the denominator of dsgu,κagru,κ+dsgu,κ is always different from zero. According to the above definition of
distance, a disagreement between u and κ can take place in three cases: in cases 3 and 4, where u has
introduced a relation (x,y) which κ does not have, and in case 6, where u has not introduced a relation
(x,y) which κ has, and no other user has introduced it either. We consider case 5 as an agreement, because
it is redundant for u to re-introduce (x,y), since this introduction will not change the gameboard.
The more disagreements there are between u and κ, the greater their distance is. Then, user classifi-
ability depends on the distance between the user and the class which is “closest” to him. The more their
distance decreases (increases), the more classifiability increases (resp. decreases).
Definition 9. The classifiability evaluation of a user w.r.t. a set of classes in a debate is given by the
function classi f iable :U×2C ×∆→ [0,1] such that classi f iable(u,K,D) = 1−min
κ∈K
distance(u,κ,D).
Example 4. Let D = 〈a,{u1,u2,u3},{〈1,u1,(b,a)〉},{〈2,u2,(c,a)〉},{〈3,u3, pass〉}〉. Here, IntroAttu1 =
{〈1,u1,(b,a)〉} and IntroSupu1 = {}. Moreover, the gameboard of D at 3 is the BAF in Example 1. Let κ
be as in Example 3. To determine distance(u1,κ) we consider, in turn, all the attacks and supports either
introduced by u1, or belonging in ASκ. u1 has introduced the attack (b,a) and it belongs to Attκ, so we
have an agreement (case 2). There is no other introduction by u1, so we now check the relations of κ.
The support (c,a) belongs to Supκ, u1 has not introduced it, but another user has introduced it (u2), so we
have another agreement (case 5). Finally, the attack (d,c) belongs to Attκ, u1 has not introduced it, and
neither has any other user, so we have a disagreement (case 6). In total, agru1,κ = 2 and dsgu1,κ = 1, thus
distance(u1,κ,D) = 13 . As a result, classi f iable(u1,{κ},D) = 1− 13 = 23 .
5 Malicious User Behavior
In the context of multi-party debates, malicious user behavior could be defined in various ways, e.g. in terms
of aggressivity. In this work, we shall call a user malicious if he undermines the satisfaction of the collective
goal (of evaluating the issue after aggregating all users’ opinions, see Section 3), More specifically, we
assume that this can happen in two ways: (1) the user may avoid to contribute towards the satisfaction of
the collective goal by hiding attacks and supports which would affect the issue’s evaluation; (2) the user
may mislead the satisfaction of the collective goal by lying (e.g. as studied in [14]); in our setting, this
amounts to stating attacks and supports he does not believe (i.e. they are not in his private BAF). Formally:
Definition 10. 〈t,u,(x,y)〉 ∈ IntroRel (such that Rel is one of Att,Sup) is a lie if and only if (x,y) 6∈ Relu;
〈t,u, pass〉 is a hide if and only if ∃(x,y) ∈ Relu (such that Rel is one of Att,Sup) such that, given D ′
obtained from D after deleting 〈t,u, pass〉 (from IntroPassDu ) and adding 〈t,u,(x,y)〉 (to IntroRelDu ):
σD ′t (a) 6= σDt (a); 〈t,u,ob j〉 is a malicious action if and only if it is a lie or a hide.
A user may decide to perform a malicious action if this may help him achieve his personal goal (see
Definition 1). From now on, users who adopt the goal of maximizing (minimizing) the issue’s evaluation
are said to be PRO (resp. CON). Let us give an example of strategic lying and hiding in our setting:
Example 5. Let u2 be a CON user, whose private BAF ASu2 is illustrated below:
a
b c
d e
ASu2
a
b
GB
a
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Firstly, we analyze the case where the gameboard of the dialogue is GB above. The only relation in ASu2
whose introduction can change a’s evaluation in GB is the support (c,a). By introducing it, a’s evaluation
increases (by the assumptions at the end of Section 2). But, since u2 is CON, he may decide to pass instead.
This would be a hide. Secondly, let us analyze the case where the gameboard is GB′ above. User u2 cannot
introduce any relation from his private BAF to change a’s evaluation, but he may decide to introduce attack
(d,c) and decrease the issue’s evaluation. Since attack (d,c) is not in ASu2 , that would be a lie.
Now that we have defined two types of malicious behaviour, we propose a method for identifying it. But
first, in addition to assuming that users are either PRO or CON, we also assume that there is a set of classes
K, such that each user belongs to one of them.
We now formulate two hypotheses about the relation between the three user attributes defined in Sec-
tion 4 and malicious actions.
Let zu denote the evaluation of an attribute, for user u, and let zu ↑ (zu ↓) indicate that the evaluation of
that attribute for u is higher (resp. lower) than the average evaluation of that attribute for all users. Also,
let LDu (H Du ) denote the percentage of introductions made by u in D which were lies (resp. hides). Finally,
let LDu ↑ (LDu ↓) indicate that the percentage of lies by u in D is higher (resp. lower) than the average
percentage of lies by all users. Similarly, let H Du ↑ (H Du ↓) indicate that the percentage of hides by user u
in D is higher (resp. lower) than the average percentage of hides by all users.
Hypothesis 1. active(u,D) ↑ and opinionated(u,a,D) ↑ and classi f iable(u,K,D) ↓ =⇒ LDu ↑
Hypothesis 1 says that a combination of high activity, high opinionatedness on the issue, and low clas-
sifiability indicates a liar. The intuition behind it is as follows. Firstly, a higher-than-average activity may
indicate a liar, since a liar is not only introducing relations appearing in his private BAF (as honest users do),
but he also “makes-up” introductions (lies) when they are useful to him. Secondly, a higher-than-average
opinionatedness on the issue may indicate a liar, since lies are always introduced strategically in order to
increase or decrease the issue’s evaluation. Thirdly, a lower-than-average classifiability may indicate a liar.
Indeed, since we have assumed that every user belongs to some class, their private BAFs are somewhat
similar to the BAF of that class. When a user “disagrees” with every class (and has a lower-than-average
classifiability), there are two possibilities: either (i) the “disagreement” is honest, or (ii) the user is lying.
Finally, a combination of the given values for all three attributes is an even stronger indication of a liar.
Hypothesis 2. active(u,D) ↓ and opinionated(u,a,D) ↑ =⇒ H Du ↑
Hypothesis 2 says that a combination of low activity and high opinionatedness on the issue indicates a
hider. The intuition behind it is as follows. Firstly, a lower-than-average activity may indicate a hider, since
a hider refrains from introducing relations which do not help achieve his personal goal (contrary to honest
users). Secondly, a higher-than-average opinionatedness may indicate a hider, for the same reason. Finally,
a combination of the given values for the two attributes is an even stronger indication of a hider.
Note that we do not claim that these hypotheses lead to the definite identification of liars and hiders.
Nonetheless, they may be valuable to debate system administrators and to users, as they can raise “red
flags” about potentially malicious users.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2 we conducted an experimental evaluation. To the best of our knowledge,
no repository exists of debates for which the maliciousness of participants is known. Therefore, we opted
for simulating debates, as follows.
– Generation of BAFs. Since many existing platforms model debates as trees, all BAFs in the simulation
(for classes, users, gameboards) were trees, all with the issue as root. We chose for these trees to have
a maximum branching factor of 4 and to contain at most 20 arguments and thus 19 relations.
– Argument evaluation. We used the function σ defined as the final score of [2].
– Generation of user classes. For each debate, we randomly generated 3 user classes (with their BAFs).
– Generation of users. From each user class, we randomly generated 4 users, as follows: we replicated
with a 90% probability each relation (and its arguments) from the class’ BAF into the user’s BAF. Thus
each user was structurally “similar”, but possibly not identical, to one class. The 4 users comprised of
• one honest user who could never lie nor hide;
• one liar user who could lie as many times as he wanted, but could never hide; the possible lies of
a user u were restricted to a randomly generated set of attacks and supports PossLiesu;
• one hider user who could hide as many times as he wanted, but could never lie;
• one malicious user who could lie, restricted to PossLiesu, and hide, as many times as he wanted.
For each experiment, the 12 users (4 × 3 classes) were partitioned into PRO and CON, as follows: a
user u was PRO if and only if the issue’s evaluation σ(a) in ASu was at least 0.5, and CON otherwise.
– Debate protocol:
• users took turns following an order over U and introducing a single relation or pass per turn;
• users were not allowed to introduce an attack or support already in the debate gameboard;
• each debate terminated after |U| passes in a row.
– User strategies. Each user u followed the strategy described informally below, with t = lastT s(D):
1. u computes the set P of all his possible relation introductions at t+1, i.e. 〈t+1,u,(x,y)〉 such that
(x,y) ∈ Attu∪Supu and σDt (a) 6=σD
′
t+1(a), where D ′ is D after introducing any member of P;
2. if u is a liar user or a malicious user then u computes the set M of all possible lie relation intro-
ductions at t + 1, i.e. 〈t + 1,u,(x,y)〉 such that (x,y) ∈ PossLiesu and σDt (a) 6= σD
′
t+1(a) where D ′
is D after introducing any member of M; all elements of M are then added to P;
3. if P = {} then the strategy returns 〈t + 1,u, pass〉; else let D pass be D after the pass introduction
〈t+1,u, pass〉 and let D i be D after the relation introduction i;
(a) if u is PRO let i∗ = argmax
i∈P
σD it+1(a); if σ
D i∗
t+1(a)> σ
D pass
t+1 (a) then the strategy returns i
∗;
(b) if u is CON let i∗ = argmin
i∈P
σD it+1(a); if σ
D i∗
t+1(a)< σ
D pass
t+1 (a) then the strategy returns i
∗;
(c) if P\PossLiesu = {} the strategy returns 〈t+1,u, pass〉;
(d) if u is a hider user or a malicious user then the strategy returns 〈t+1,u, pass〉;
(e) otherwise, the strategy returns a random member of P\PossLiesu.
Intuitively, the user first tries to (greedily) choose the relation introduction which is best (or tied for best)
for him (cases 3.(a) and 3.(b)). But, if all possible relation introductions are bad for him, then: if they are
all lies, then he “honestly” passes (case 3.(c)), whether he is a liar, a hider, both or neither. Otherwise, there
exist some truthful moves, and in this case a hider or malicious user will pass (hiding), whereas a user who
cannot hide will be forced to play a bad move.
We implemented this debate setting in Java, and we generated and analyzed a number of debates as
follows. For each debate, for each of the 12 users in it, we calculated whether he had lied more than the
average user (or not), and whether he had hidden more than the average user (or not). Then, for each user
u, we tested the prediction given by the two hypotheses: if the attribute values of u were as indicated on the
left-hand side of Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2), then we estimated that u was an above-average liar (resp.
hider). We also tested the predictions given by reversing the hypotheses: if the attribute values of u were
not as indicated on the left-hand side of Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2), then we estimated that u was not an
above-average liar (resp. hider). This led to the following types of estimations:
– Correct estimations:
• true positive: u was predicted to be a liar (resp. hider), and he was;
• true negative: u was predicted not to be a liar (resp. hider), and he was not.
– Erroneous estimations:
• false positive: u was predicted to be a liar (resp. hider), but he was not.
• false negative: u was predicted not to be a liar (resp. hider), but he was.
We generated 100,000 debates, with 100,000×12=1,200,000 users. The results are summarised below:
Malicious action True positives False positives True negatives False negatives
Lying 163,408 73,829 726,681 236,082
Hiding 211,514 193,378 613,497 181,611
Albeit preliminary, these results seem to confirm our hypotheses: as far as lying is concerned, there were
approximately 2.2 times more true positives than false positives, and approximately 3 times more true
negatives than false negatives; as far as hiding is concerned, the number of false positives was relatively high
(compared to lying), though still lower than the number of true positives, while there were approximately
3.5 times more true negatives than false negatives.
7 Conclusion
Malicious user behavior analysis in on-line debates has recently caught the attention of researchers, e.g.
in the case of trolls or flamers [9]. At the same time, interest in multi-party debates has grown steadily.
Argumentation-based debate platforms offer their users the possibility of expressing their thoughts in a
structured way, e.g. by introducing arguments and relations among them. This paper is a first step towards
undertaking the analysis of malicious user behavior in multi-party argumentation debates. We have iden-
tified and evaluated empirically, in a simulated debate setting, two hypotheses providing indications of
potential malicious behaviour, in the form of lying and hiding. The hypotheses are formulated in terms of
three user attributes, computed by observing users debate and measuring their activity, opinionatedness and
classifiability. Albeit preliminary, the evaluation shows promise.
Our work has several limitations and opens the way to many directions for future work. It would be
interesting to evaluate our approach in a real debate setting, rather than a simulated environment. Other user
attributes, e.g. focus on specific arguments, may also provide useful information. Moreover, in addition to
general-stance and belief attributes of the kinds we considered, we could consider a third category of
attributes describing the relations a user has with others, for example his popularity. Our analysis focused
on single debates, but it may be useful to compare the behaviour of users across debates (potentially in
different platforms). We have programmed agents to follow a specific strategy, but other strategies, e.g.
the ones overviewed in [15], may be interesting. Other hypotheses may provide further indications of
maliciousness, and it may be interesting to learn, rather than guess as in this paper, relationships between
user attributes and malicious behaviour. Our evaluation was restricted to a specific semantics for bipolar
argumentation: it would be interesting to study the impact of different choices of semantics for prediction
of maliciousness. The argumentation framework used throughout this work was just an example and it is
possible to use other, more elaborate, argumentation frameworks instead, e.g. allowing for votes as in [7,
8]. Another direction for future research includes the identification of additional types of malicious users,
such as trolls, flamers, or even users simply searching for “friends” and neglecting the collective goal of
a debate. Also, it may be interesting to draw insights from existing work on lying [14] in order to further
characterise malicious behaviour.
Acknowledgments. This research was supported by the EU project DesMOLD (FP7/2007-2013-314581).
References
1. Amgoud, L., Cayrol, C., Lagasquie-Schiex, M.C., Livet, P.: On bipolarity in argumentation frameworks. Interna-
tional Journal of Intelligent Systems 23, 1062–1093 (2008)
2. Baroni, P., Romano, M., Toni, F., Aurisicchio, M., Bertanza, G.: Automatic evaluation of design alternatives with
quantitative argumentation. Argument & Computation 6(1), 24–49 (2015), special issue: Applications of logical
approaches to argumentation
3. Boella, G., Gabbay, D.M., van der Torre, L.W., Villata, S.: Support in abstract argumentation. In: Proceedings of
the 3rd International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA’10). pp. 111–122 (2010)
4. Bonzon, E., Maudet, N.: On the outcomes of multiparty persuasion. In: Proceedings of the Tenth International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS’11). pp. 47–54 (2011)
5. Cayrol, C., Lagasquie-Schiex, M.C.: Gradual valuation for bipolar argumentation frameworks. In: Proceedings
of the European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (EC-
SQARU’05). pp. 366–377 (2005)
6. Coste-Marquis, S., Devred, C., Konieczny, S., Lagasquie-Schiex, M.C., Marquis, P.: On the Merging of Dung’s
Argumentation Systems. Artificial Intelligence 171, 740–753 (2007)
7. Egilmez, S., Martins, J., Leite, J.: Extending social abstract argumentation with votes on attacks. In: Proceedings
of the Second Workshop on Theory and Applications of Formal Argumentation (TAFA’13). pp. 16–31 (2013)
8. Evripidou, V., Toni, F.: Quaestio-it.com: a social intelligent debating platform. Journal of Decision Systems 23(3),
333–349 (2014)
9. Hardaker, C.: Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication: From user discussions to academic
definitions. Journal of Politeness Research. Language, Behaviour, Culture 6, 215–242 (2010)
10. Kontarinis, D., Bonzon, E., Maudet, N., Moraitis, P.: Picking the right expert to make a debate uncontroversial. In:
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA’12). pp.
486–497 (2012)
11. Prakken, H.: Coherence and flexibility in dialogue games for argumentation. Journal of Logic and Computation
15(6), 1009–1040 (2005)
12. Rahwan, I., Larson, K.: Argumentation and game theory. In: Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 321–339.
Springer (2009)
13. Riveret, R., Prakken, H., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G.: Heuristics in argumentation: A game theory investigation. In:
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Computational Models of Argument (COMMA’08). pp.
324–335 (2008)
14. Sakama, C., Caminada, M., Herzig, A.: A logical account of lying. In: Logics in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 286–
299. Springer (2010)
15. Thimm, M.: Strategic argumentation in multi-agent systems. Ku¨nstliche Intelligenz 28(3), 159–168 (2014)
